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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Steven Sparling conditionally pied guilty to possession of marijuana with the 
intent to deliver, preserving his right to challenge the district court's denial of his motion 
to suppress. Mr. Sparling asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion to 
suppress as his initially lawful seizure was unreasonably and unlawfully extended, in 
violation of his right to be free from unreasonable seizures. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In August of 2012, Steven Sparling was driving north on Highway 95 in Owyhee 
County, came to a complete stop at a stop sign, crossed Highway 55, and pulled into a 
gas station. (R., p.13; Tr. 1/25/13, p.32, L.16 - p.36, L.5.)1 Mr. Sparling testified that he 
used his turn signal prior to turning into the gas station noting that he was aware there 
was a police officer behind him. (Tr. 1/25/13, p.36, Ls.6-17.) Although he did not 
explain why, Officer Brent Higley of the Idaho State testified that he was targeting 
Mr. Sparling's vehicle, saw him cross the intersection and turn into the gas station, 
without using a turn signal. (Tr. 1/25/13, p.45, L.8 - p.46, L.12; Tr. Prelim, p.25, L.18 -
p.26, L.5.) Officer Higley pulled in behind Mr. Sparling at the gas station and seized 
him. (Ex. A (audio/video recording of encounter)2.) 
1 In addition to the testimony presented during the suppression hearing, the district court 
took judicial notice of Officer Higley's probable cause affidavit and the transcript of the 
preliminary hearing. (Tr. 1 /25/13, p.26, Ls.16-20.) The probable cause affidavit is found 
at pages 12-13 of the Clerk's Record, and the transcript of the preliminary hearing is 
included as an exhibit on this appeal. 
2 The DVD containing the audio/video of the encounter was entered into evidence as 
Exhibit A. While the DVD itself is nearly one and one-half hour long, the portion 
1 
Mr. Sparling got out of his car and walked toward Officer Higley, Officer Higley 
told Mr. Sparling that he stopped him for failing to use a turn signal and asked him for 
his driver's license and registration. Id. Officer Higley testified that Mr. Sparling was 
"extremely anxious to separate himself from the vehicle" and claimed that his hands 
were shaking when he provided his license and registration. (Tr. Prelim., p.6, L.19 -
p. 7, L.12.) As soon as he noticed that Mr. Sparling's behavior was "different" from what 
he would suspect in a "normal traffic stop," Officer Higley decided to investigate for 
drugs. (Tr. Prelim., p.24, L.22 - p.25, L.6.) 
The two walked back to Mr. Sparling's car and, while Mr. Sparling was retrieving 
his information from inside the car, Officer Higley asked him questions about why he 
had stopped at the gas station/convenience store, and about where he was travelling 
from. (Ex. A.) Mr. Sparling told Officer Higley that he had been travelling from San 
Jose, California, and he handed Officer Higley the requested information. Id. While 
answering Officer Higley's question about what he was doing in California (working as a 
contractor), Mr. Sparling got out of his car. Id. Officer Higley asked Mr. Sparling to get 
back into his car and Mr. Sparling complied. Id. Officer Higley then asked whether the 
information was current, and Mr. Sparling replied that it was. Id. 
While holding Mr. Sparling's license and registration, Officer Higley asked 
another question about Mr. Sparling's contracting work. Id. He then asked if there was 
anything in the vehicle that he should be concerned with, to which Mr. Sparling 
answered there was not. Id. Officer Higley asked Mr. Sparling to take off his 
relevant to this appeal is contained in approximately the first seven and one-half 
minutes. 
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sunglasses and then asked more questions about his travel and how long he was in 
California. Id. Officer Higley told Mr. Sparling that he was going to be back with him 
shortly so that he could get him on his way, told him that he was going to shut the door 
for him, and suggested that Mr. Sparling roll down the window. Id. While Mr. Sparling 
was rolling the window down, Officer Higley again asked him about doing contracting 
work in California and whether it was as bad down there as it was up here. Id. While 
getting out of his car, Mr. Sparling said that things were bad and asked if he could 
stand, and Officer Higley said that would be fine. Id. 
While Mr. Sparling was standing outside his car, the following exchange 
occurred: 
Officer Higley: You seem a little nervous, is everything alright? 
Mr. Sparling: Everything's fine, you know. I know what's going on. 
Officer Higley: What's that? 
Mr. Sparling: Huh? 
Officer Higley: What's that? 
Mr. Sparling: I mean, you're pulling me over for nothing. 
Officer Higley: For not using your turn signal? 
Mr. Sparling: Whatever. 
Officer Higley: That's nothing? 
Mr. Sparling: Whatever. 
Officer Higley: Ok, is there anything in the car I should be 
concerned with? 
Mr. Sparling: No 
Officer Higley: May I search your car? 
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Mr. Sparling: No. 
Id. Officer Higley walked back towards his car, asked Mr. Sparling if he had any 
weapons to which he responded he did not, and Officer Higley got into his car and ran 
Mr. Sparling's license information which came back as valid. Id. 
By the time Office Higley approached Mr. Sparling again, Officer Whitworth of the 
Bureau of Land Management was at the gas station with his drug dog.3 (Tr. Prelim, 
p.27, L.3 - p.30, L.15.) After Officer Higley informed Mr. Sparling that the drug dog was 
going to be run around his car, Mr. Sparling gave Officer Higley consent to search his 
person. (Ex. A.) Although no contraband was found on Mr. Sparling, Officer Higley 
claimed that he could smell the odor of "raw" marijuana coming from Mr. Sparling.4 
(Tr. Prelim, p.8, L.1 - p.9, L.4, p.21, Ls.12-14.) While the drug dog was performing an 
exterior sniff and approximately 5 minutes after the seizure began, Mr. Sparling 
admitted that there were "roaches" in the center console in response to a question from 
Officer Higley. (Exh. A.) After circling the car multiple times, the drug dog "alerted" on 
the driver's side door of the car and a subsequent search revealed approximately 388 
grams of marijuana in the trunk. (Exh. A; R., p.13) 
The State filed a Complaint alleging that Mr. Sparling committed felony 
possession of marijuana with the intent to deliver and misdemeanor possession of drug 
3 It is not clear from the record at what point Officer Whitworth arrived on the scene 
other than it was sometime after Mr. Sparling was seized. (Tr. Prelim, p.29, L.6 - p.30, 
L.10, p.35, L.16- p.37, L.10; Ex. A.) 
4 Curiously, Officer Higley failed to mention in his probable cause affidavit that he 
smelled marijuana while searching Mr. Sparling, and the only "raw" marijuana found 
was in the trunk of Mr. Sparling's car and gave off an odor that not even the drug dog 
could apparently detect. (R., p.13; Ex. A.) 
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paraphernalia. (R., pp.9-13.) After a preliminary hearing, Mr. Sparling was bound over 
into the district court and an Information was filed charging him with the above crimes. 
(R., pp.20-22, 25-28.) 
Mr. Sparling filed a motion to suppress asserting that his constitutional right to be 
free from unreasonable searches and seizures, as protected by both the Idaho and 
Federal constitutions, was violated because his initial seizure was not supported by 
reasonable suspicion, and that, even if his seizure was initially justified, it was 
unreasonably extended in length and scope.5 (R., pp.33-35.) After considering the 
evidence presented and the arguments of counsel, the district court orally pronounced 
its ruling. (Tr. 1 /25/13.) Although the district court found that the video was not clear, 
the court found Officer Higley's testimony that Mr. Sparling did not use his turn signal to 
be credible. (Tr. 1 /25/13, p.76, L.11 - p.80, L.5.) The Court also found that Officer 
Higley's testimony that Mr. Sparling was "extremely anxious" to separate himself from 
his car was credible, and while it did not seem unusual to the court, it was unusual to 
the officer. (Tr. 1/25/13, p.85, L.13 - p.87, L.7.) The court also found Officer Higley's 
testimony that he smelled marijuana on Mr. Sparling when he searched him to be 
credible. (Tr. 1/25/13, p.88, L.12 - p.90, L.10.) Thus, the Court found that the initial 
seizure was justified based upon Mr. Sparling failing to signal, the stop was not 
unreasonably extended, at the point Officer Higley smelled marijuana he had probable 
cause to arrest Mr. Sparling for possession of marijuana, and that Mr. Sparling's 
5 Mr. Sparling also initially claimed that his Miranda rights were violated but he implicitly 
abandoned that claim during the suppression hearing, arguing only that his seizure was 
not justified at its inception, or alternatively, that its length and scope were unreasonably 
extended. (R., pp.33-35; Tr. 1/25/13, p.61, L.6 - p.67, L.24, p.72, L.20 - p.74, L.23.) 
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admission to roaches and the drug dog sniff were additional justifications for the search 
of Mr. Sparling's car. (Tr. 1/25/13, p.90, L.11 - p.93, L.7; p.103, L.20 - p.105, L.19.) 
The district court denied the motion to suppress. (R., pp.70-72; Tr. 1/25/13, p.105, 
Ls.16-19.) 
Mr. Sparling entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of marijuana with the 
intent to deliver6, preserving his right to challenge the district court's denial of his motion 
to suppress, and the parties stipulated to a withheld judgment with Mr. Sparling placed 
on probation for a period of two years. (R., pp.89-90; Tr. 7/12/13, p.1, L.4- p.11, L.1.) 
The district court followed the terms of the agreement and withheld judgment, placing 
Mr. Sparling on probation for a period of two years. (R., pp.113-115; Tr. 10/25/13, p.4, 
L.1 - p.14, L.8.) Mr. Sparling filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.126-128.) 
6 Mr. Sparling entered a plea pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), 
for the "intent to deliver" portion of the charge, claiming that the marijuana he possessed 
was for his person use but recognizing the State had sufficient evidence to prove that 
he intended to deliver the marijuana to another based upon statements he made to the 
police. (Tr. 7/12/13. p.1, L.4 - p.11, L.1.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Sparling's motion to suppress after his 
initially lawful seizure was unreasonably extended? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Sparling's Motion To Suppress As His 
Initially Lawful Seizure Was Unreasonably Extended 
A. Introduction 
In light of the district court's factual finding that he failed to use his turn signal, 
Mr. Sparling does not challenge the district court's legal finding that his initial seizure 
was justified. However, he asserts that Officer Higley unreasonably extended the scope 
and length of his seizure beyond the time necessary to issue a citation for failure to use 
a turn signal, without an objectively reasonable suspicion that Mr. Sparling was 
engaged in any other illegal activity. Therefore, Mr. Sparling asserts that the district 
court erred in denying his motion to suppress. 
B. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Sparling's Motion To Suppress 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision 
on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court's 
findings of fact which were supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the 
application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 
Idaho 559, 561 (Ct. App. 1996). The power to assess the credibility of witnesses 
testifying at a suppression hearing, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw 
factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Reyna, 142 Idaho 624, 626 
(Ct. App. 2006). 
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The Fourth Amendment7 to the United States Constitution guarantees citizens 
the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. Amend. IV. 
Its purpose is "to impose a standard of 'reasonableness' upon the exercise of discretion 
by government officials, including law enforcement agents, in order to 'safeguard the 
privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions."' Delaware v. Prouse, 440 
U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979) (quoting Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978)). 
If evidence is not seized pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, 
the evidence discovered as a result of the illegal search must be excluded as the "fruit 
of the poisonous tree." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
The stop of a vehicle constitutes a seizure of its occupants and is therefore 
subject to Fourth Amendment restraints. Id. at 653. A police officer may stop a vehicle 
for investigative purposes if the officer has an objectively reasonable basis for 
suspecting that the vehicle or an occupant is involved in criminal activity. Id. at 663. 
There must exist "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational 
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
1, 21 (1968). Reasonable suspicion requires less than probable cause but more than 
speculation on the part of the officer. State v. Van Dorne, 139 Idaho 961, 963 (Ct. App. 
2004 ). "[A]n investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 
(1983). "Similarly, the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive 
means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of 
7 Mr. Sparling did not make a separate argument under Article I, § 17 of the Idaho 
Constitution which similarly protects people from unreasonable searches and seizures. 
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time." Id. Officers can abandon the original purpose of a routine traffic stop only where 
the extension itself is justified by reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. 
State v. Denney, 153 Idaho 405, 409-410 (2011 ). 
Mr. Sparling asserts that Officer Higley unlawfully extended his seizure by 
delaying checking his license and registration information by asking questions unrelated 
to the purpose of the seizure. Simply put, Officer Higley's questions about whether the 
construction business was better in California than it was in Idaho, and how long he had 
been travelling is unrelated to whether or not Mr. Sparling used a turn signal. 
Furthermore, Mr. Sparling asserts that being nervous and not wanting to be in his car on 
a hot afternoon in the beginning of August is insufficient to justify a further detention, as 
these facts in addition to not using a turn signal do not lead to an objectively reasonable 
suspicion that Mr. Sparling was involved in criminal activity. Therefore, Mr. Sparling 
asserts that between the time Officer Higley had his driver's license and registration and 
the time Officer Higley returned to his car and "ran" his information, his Fourth 
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures was violated. 
Mr. Sparling recognizes that Officer Higley delayed running the information for 
only a short period of time. He further acknowledges that the Idaho Court of Appeals 
has held that "brief inquiries not otherwise related to the initial purpose of the stop do 
not necessarily violate a detainee's Fourth Amendment rights." State v. Parkinson, 135 
Idaho 357, 362 (Ct. App. 2000). However, it does not appear that either the United 
States Supreme Court or the Idaho Supreme Court has weakened the Fourth 
Amendment's protections to that extent as those Courts have not adopted the Court of 
Appeals' reasoning. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (stating "an 
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investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to 
effectuate the purpose of the stop."); see also State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 658 
(2007). Mr. Sparling recognizes that the district court was bound to follow the Parkinson 
decision; however, the Idaho Supreme Court is not. See State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 
981, 984-987 (1991) (recognizing that Court of Appeals' opinions are binding on lower 
courts, but noting that the denial of a Petition for Review does not mean the Supreme 
Court has adopted the Court of Appeals' holding, and "[t]his Court has been and 
remains the final arbiter of Idaho rules of law, both those promulgated and those 
evolving decisionally.") 
in light of Royer, Henage, and Denney, Mr. Sparling asserts that the district erred 
in finding that Officer Higley did not unlawfully extend his detention beyond the time 
necessary to write a ticket for failure to use a turn signal, as there was no objectively 
reasonable basis to suspect Mr. Sparling was involved in any other criminal activity. As 
his admission to having "roaches" in the car, the drug dog sniff, and the ultimate 
discovery of the marijuana in the trunk stemmed from this unreasonable extension of his 




Mr. Sparling respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order 
of judgment and commitment and reverse the order which denied his motion to 
suppress. 
DATED this 18th day of July, 2014. 
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